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The current economic crisis has lent extra urgency to ASEAN’s efforts at economic 
integration and raising its attractiveness for trade and investment. This process gained 
momentum in the 1990s and has made much progress, as reflected in the emergence of a 
wide range of extra- and intra-regional agreements. However, the effectiveness of this 
network of arrangements in stimulating trade and investment depends on not just the 
characteristics of each arrangement but how well they complement each other. This paper 
addresses these two areas by examining and evaluating past and present initiatives 
individually and collectively. Findings suggest that the fundamental impeding issues have 
endured over the years: lack of political will, ASEAN-style consensus-reliant negotiation, 
and insufficient management in implementing and harmonising of initiatives. 
Recommendations include agreement design innovation and focus on shared concerns to 
overcome lack of will, role expansion of the secretariat to monitor implementation through 
issuance of score cards, and establishment of specialised bodies such as sub-committees and 

















ASEAN regional cooperation on trade and investment cannot be seen in isolation 
from the group’s broader thrust on economic integration. The latter gained momentum with 
the birth of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, and accelerated after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. The late 1990s saw a surge in interest in regionalism in ASEAN and East 
Asia
1. The movement towards an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), part of the ASEAN 
Vision 2020, was also started based on existing initiatives such as the AFTA, ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). There have 




More recently, as part of a worldwide trend, ASEAN countries have showed 
heightened interest in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with partners outside the region 
(See Table 1). Regional trade agreements (RTAs) that are in force or undergoing negotiations 
mainly consist of those working on the ASEAN+1 mechanism (see section 3.3.1.) and within 
Asia-Pacific
3. Bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) have also proliferated between ASEAN 
members and their Northern neighbours China, Japan and South Korea, as well as with 
partners around the world, from Australia to Chile to India to United States. Besides PTAs, 
there have also been other forms of extra-ASEAN economic cooperation such as APEC and 
ASEM. 
 
Thus, ASEAN regional trade and investment-related cooperation initiatives are 
embedded and form part of a network of intra- and cross-regional arrangements. How 
effective this web is at encouraging trade and investment flows within and without the region 
depends on not just the characteristics of each arrangement but how well they complement 
each other. 
 
This paper addresses both areas by examining and assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the relevant economic arrangements concerning ASEAN, both individually 
and in relation with each other. Initiatives related to the three pillars of AEC – trade, 
investment and services – are first explored, followed by other avenues of cooperation, 
namely financial and market integration, and dispute settlement. Based on the lessons drawn 





1 East Asia in this paper refers to ASEAN members and China, Japan and South Korea, which are collectively 
known as ASEAN+3. 
2 Examples of sub-regional level economic cooperatives are the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Economic 
Cooperation, Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines 
East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) and East-West Economic Corridor (Vietnam-Lao-Thailand-
Myanmar). 
3 Examples include the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) and Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement (TPSEPA).   5
I. ASEAN  Economic  Cooperation 
The formalisation of ASEAN economic cooperation can be traced to the Bali Summit 
in 1976, where landmark treaties
4 calling for cooperation on economic development were 
signed. However, regional strategies that grew from there, namely the ASEAN Industrial 
Projects Scheme (AIPs)
5, ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV)
6 and ASEAN PTA
7, were 
largely unsuccessful.  
 
Reasons for the failures are similar. First, there was a lack of political will. Members 
were more interested in developing their own economies and integrating into the global 
market than cooperating with ASEAN. This attitude stemmed from members’ post-
independence need for self-reliance
8, and the competitive rather than complementary nature 
of their manufacturing sectors (Chirathivat, 1996). For instance, the ASEAN PTA, which was 
created more for import-substitution than open trade and investment (Kodama, 1996), had a 
product-by-product approach that led to extensive exclusion lists. The result: in the late 
1980s, the agreement accounted for only five per cent of total ASEAN trade. Second, 
institutional mechanisms were weak. Goals and guidelines for negotiations were not 
established and administration was inefficient. Third, the private sector and foreign investors 
were insufficiently mobilised because of lack of publicity or attractiveness of the projects. 
 
The early 1990s saw a newfound commitment to economic cooperation in ASEAN
9. 
Initiatives that have been created since then are currently consolidated under the umbrella 
vision of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which represents the end-goal of a single 
market through economic integration. As stated in the Bali Concord II declaration, this means 
“a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a 
                                                            
4 These treaties were namely the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord. They can be retrieved from http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm and 
http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm respectively. 
5 The ASEAN Industrial Projects Scheme (AIPs) was implemented in 1976. Under the scheme, ASEAN 
members would allocate a large-scale, capital intensive project to each member, to be financed 60 percent by the 
host country and 40 percent by other members. Out of the five AIPs introduced in 1976, only two of them 
became fully operational. 
6 The ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) was introduced in 1983 as the sister scheme to the ASEAN 
Industrial Complementation Scheme (AICS), and has now been replaced by the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation 
(AICO) Scheme. It encompasses private-sector driven projects aimed at facilitating horizontal specializations in 
various manufacturing sectors. The goal is to increase investment into and within ASEAN, and to raise 
industrial production. The Basic Agreement on AIJV can be retrieved from http://www.aseansec.org/1366.htm 
7 The ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) was launched in 1977 to liberalize trade in the region. 
The margin of preference started at 10 percent and was later raised to 40 percent. Local content started at 50 
percent and was later reduced to 35 percent.  
8 The end of World War II saw many states, including many countries in ASEAN, gain independence. This 
created a zealous movement based on concepts such as interdependence, self-reliance and self-resilience. Newly 
independent states focused on establishing self-reliant national economies and sovereign governments. 
9 This was largely due to fears in ASEAN that the region would be left out in a world where trading blocs were 
on the rise, and members’ will to sustain growth rates.   6
free flow of goods, services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic 
development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in 2020” (ASEAN, 2003).  
The mainstay of this vision is AFTA, which is complemented by a spectrum of other 
arrangements. Benefits from tariff reductions are stretched with investment liberalisation 
through the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). Other arrangements such as the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), e-ASEAN Framework Agreement and ASEAN 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) serve to boost integration in priority sectors, facilitate 
movement of persons, and strengthen institutional mechanisms. 
 
Arrangements arising out of economic cooperation between ASEAN and Northeast 
Asia, a collaborative known as the East Asian Community or ASEAN+3, also contribute to 
the realisation of AEC. Most notably, financial integration through the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI)
10 and Asian Bonds Markets Initiative
11 is instrumental in facilitating trade and 
investment.  
 
II. Trade Cooperation 
2.1.  ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
 
The primary aim of AFTA is to “increase ASEAN’s competitive edge as a production 
base geared for the world market” (ASEAN, 1999). Its main feature is trade liberalisation 
through the elimination of intra-ASEAN tariffs and non-tariff barriers, which would then 
raise the efficiency and cost effectiveness of doing business and promote trade and 
investment in a fashion consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)
12. This implies raising intra-regional trade is secondary. Indeed, although the value 
of intra-ASEAN trade has more than doubled in the past decade, it has risen much slower in 
terms of proportion of countries’ total trade (from about 18 percent in the early 1990s to 22 
percent in 2001)
13. Also, total extra-ASEAN trade is around three times the total intra-
ASEAN trade (see Table 3).  
 
The agreement’s main mechanism is the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) Scheme
14, which is unique in its flexibility and gradualism. Under it, each member 
                                                            
10 The goal of the Chiang Mai Initiative is to create a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) among 
ASEAN+3 countries to address short-term liquidity difficulties and to supplement international financial 
arrangements. 
11 The Asian Bonds Markets Initiative aims to develop efficient and liquid bond markets in Asia, enabling 
better usage of Asian savings for Asian investments. 
12 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was introduced in 1947 and currently includes around 
150 countries. The multilateral agreement aims to provide an international forum that facilitates free trade 
between partner states by regulating and reducing tariffs on traded goods and by providing a common 
mechanism for resolving disputes. 
13 Based on material from ASEAN Secretariat 
14 For more information about the scheme and AFTA, see: ASEAN. (1999). ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): 
An update. Retrieved from ASEAN Secretariat website: http://www.aseansec.org/7665.htm   7
allocates goods that are subject to tariffs to one of four lists – Inclusion List (IL), Temporary 
Exclusion List (TEL), Sensitive List (SL) and General Exception List (GEL). Each list has 
different tariff reduction deadlines. Countries also have different deadlines; the less 
developed CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) are allowed more time to 
liberalise. 
 
This flexibility has proven to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, it caters to the 
wide developmental gap in ASEAN by allowing unique treatment for each member, easing 
agreement negotiations. However, there have been abuses and backtracking. Vietnam, for 
instance, has put a larger than average proportion of products in its GEL
15 (Tan, 1998). 
Further, gradualism has led to a slow liberalisation process.  
 
Other shortcomings of AFTA are reminiscent of previous failures at economic 
cooperation. Besides a lack of private sector awareness, details have not been thoroughly 
drawn out. For example, the application of Rules of Origin (ROO) is unclear. This is perhaps 
due to ASEAN’s style of agreeing first and negotiating the details later
16. A new 
improvement of the AFTA, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA)
17, addresses 
some of these shortcomings; although being new its effectiveness remains to be seen. For 
instance, the arrangement includes greater transparency of the trade liberalisation processes 
and trade facilitation in areas such as customs and standards, technical regulation and 
conformity assessment procedures – improvements that would help businesses navigate and 
make use of the AFTA more easily.  
 
AFTA has been expanded and become one of the three pillars of ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) together with ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Area (AIA) and 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). The completion of AEC has been 
accelerated from 2020 to 2015. The adoption of AEC Blueprint in November 2007 has 






15 Vietnam’s GEL accounts for 5.9 percent of its total tariff lines, more than three and a half times the general 
proportion in ASEAN. Its GEL contains 165 product categories, including automobiles and motorcycles, 
computers, telecommunication and information technology equipment and food and beverage products (Tan, 
1998). 
16 See: Soesastro (2005, p. 2) 
17 The ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) integrates all existing and new ASEAN commitments and 
initiatives related to trade in goods into one comprehensive framework. The agreement’s coverage includes 
tariff liberalization, elimination of non-tariff barriers, rules of origin, trade facilitation, custom procedures, 
standards and conformance, and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. It was signed by the Economic 
Ministers of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia and Singapore in Singapore on 16 December 2008. 
More information can be found in the press releases on the ASEAN Secretariat website: 
http://www.aseansec.org/22116.htm   8
2.2.  Extra-ASEAN PTAs
18 
 
2.2.1.  ASEAN+1 
 
ASEAN seems poised to gain a prominent position in the emerging network of PTAs in 
Asia-Pacific. Since 2002, the group has become party to FTA negotiations with Australia-
New Zealand, China, India, Japan, Korea and the EU. These initiatives, known as the 
ASEAN+1 mechanism, have adopted AFTA’s framework and have a comprehensive scope 
that encompasses not just trade but investment, services, IT, customs harmonising and 
antidumping. Hence, the term ‘Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP)’ has been 
preferred to FTA. This strategy is in line with the AFTA’s focus on extra- rather than intra-
regional trade and investment, which is apt given the countries that are involved in the 
ASEAN+1 agreements have are some of the main trade and investment partners of ASEAN 
(see Table 4 and 5). 
 
In August 2007, ASEAN countries agreed to a moratorium on completing more 
advanced intra-regional FTAs, namely with China, Japan, Korea and Australia-New Zealand, 
before focusing on other FTA proposals
19. Of the four FTAs, the ASEAN-China
20 is the most 
advanced. Its Early Harvest package containing some industrial and agricultural goods and 
dispute settlement mechanism came into force in 2005. China’s average tariff on ASEAN 
countries’ goods was reduced from 9.9 to 5.8 percent in 2007 and is expected to be 
eliminated in 2010
21. Bilateral trade has surged since both sides agreed to establish the FTA; 




2.2.2.  BTAs 
 
In the same time ASEAN+1 FTA negotiations are going on, members have been 
pursing FTAs of their own with partners outside the region. This is unlike their American and 
European counterparts, who only started doing so after regional arrangements have solidified 
rather than before. China, Japan and Korea account for a substantial proportion of the BTAs 
involving ASEAN countries (nine out of 20 that are in force), many of which adopt the CEP 
approach. Already, some of these BTAs seem to have yielded results. Malaysia’s trade with 
                                                            
18 The complete list of PTAs involving ASEAN countries can be found in Table 1. 
19 See: Cahiles-Magkilat, B. (2007, August 21). ASEAN stops new intra-regional FTAs. Manila Bulletin. 
20 The complete text of the ACFTA can be obtained from the ASEAN Secretariat website at: 
http://www.aseansec.org/4979.htm. For a concise summary and deeper analysis of the ACFTA, see: Sheng, L. 
(2003). China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, developments and strategic motivations. ISEAS Working 
Paper: International Politics & Security Issues Series No.1. 
21 See: Xinhua News. (2007, October 20). China-ASEAN trade speeds up. Retrieved from Xinhua News 
website: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/20/content_6915888.htm 
22 See: ASEAN. (1998, August 27). Joint media statement of the seventh AEM-MOFCOM consultations. 
Retrieved from the ASEAN Secretariat website: http://www.aseansec.org/21893.htm   9
Japan grew to US$ 32.4 billion in 2006, a 2.5 percent increase from 2005, when the FTA 
between the two countries came into force
23.  
 
Having 10 concluded ‘WTO consistent’
24 FTAs, Singapore is the frontrunner in the 
region, making it a suitable reference point for FTA strategy in ASEAN. One of its key 
success factors is its autonomous liberalisation policy for both goods and services, which has 
enabled it to conclude FTA negotiations with relative ease and speed.  
 
Another factor is its innovation at FTA design (Low, 2003). The Japan-Singapore 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA)
25 in particular presents a useful template for the 
rest of ASEAN because of its creative measures for reconciling conflicting interests. First, 
negotiations were based on a preceding joint study group made up of officials, academics and 
businessmen that provided not only expertise but space, time and publicity needed to resolve 
perceived threats (Rajan et al., 2001 & 2002). Singapore’s threat to Japan’s agricultural sector 
was seen more in terms of a “backdoor” effect due to its links to ASEAN. This was further 
resolved as both sides agreed to keep what they have committed to WTO, but extend 
cooperation beyond tariff elimination in goods to also focus on service trade liberalisation, 
investment and movement of natural persons, and to include “new age” areas such as science 
and technology, ICT and SME promotion. The agreement was also made more robust with 
dispute settlement and review mechanisms.  
 
There are also lessons to be learned from the Singapore example. One important pointer 
is that foreign economic policy has to go hand in hand with domestic strategies. As more 
FTAs come into play, Singapore has had to re-examine its policy of restricting the number of 
doctors and lawyers and controlling imports of cars, tobacco and liquor products. Its 
developmental state and industrial policy based on state-related enterprises also have to be 
shifted to raise competitiveness. 
 
2.2.3.  Complements or impediments to AFTA?  
 
This new impetus of extra-ASEAN PTAs presents opportunities as well as challenges 
for ASEAN economic integration. Singapore has taken the stand that BTAs with partners 
outside the region provide an impetus to ASEAN trade liberalisation (Vandoren, 2005). And 
members such as Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines have followed its lead, initiating 
agreements of their own.  
 
Although it remains to be seen whether this approach is in effect complementary to 
AFTA, there are some positive signs. First, the multi-faceted CEP approach that many of the 
                                                            
23 See: Asian Economic News. (2007, February 12). Malaysia-Japan FTA boosts exports, narrow trade deficit. 
Asian Economic News. 
24 Singapore’s FTAs are generally deemed ‘WTO consistent’ and ‘WTO plus’. They cover in principle 
‘substantially all trade’ stated in WTO guidelines and a broad range of other issues, including services, trade 
facilitation, dispute settlement, investment, government procurement and intellectual property. 
25 The full text of the JSEPA can be obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/singapore/jsepa.html. For a detailed summary and deeper analysis of the 
JSEPA, see: Kim, Y. (2002). Assessment of Japan-Singapore FTA: Focusing on eliminating trade barriers of 
Japan. GSIS-SEeoul National University, Thesis.    10
PTAs take shows a willingness to go beyond the normal provisions of FTAs, reflecting strong 
political intention. This willingness to liberalise and cooperate economically with other 
countries may spill-over to provide ASEAN and East Asian negotiations a boost.  
 
Next, as trade data concerning China-ASEAN FTA and some BTAs show, extra-
ASEAN FTAs seem to be more effective at stimulating trade than AFTA. This is consistent 
with observations that ASEAN economies are more competitive than complementary. Thus, 
ASEAN’s open regionalism approach and focus on raising the region’s competitiveness 
rather than intra-regional trade is a suitable one.  
 
However, there are potential downsides as well. First, this proliferation of PTAs 
between members and non-ASEAN partners may weaken commitment to region-wide and 
global free and open trade and investment. Such agreements may be efforts to take advantage 
of loopholes to protect sensitive sectors. This was evident during Japan-Singapore FTA 
negotiations, where Japan insisted on excluding segments of agriculture for which Singapore 
has potential in developing an export base. Also, a chain reaction might spark as ASEAN 
countries that have less aggressive FTA strategies might scurry to step up efforts after 
realising that other members are negotiating FTAs that can discriminate against them. As 
more of such agreements are signed, members would be less willing to bend to regional or 
global trade negotiations.  
 
Second, as less developed members are left out of extra-ASEAN FTA negotiations, 
the economic gulf in the region may widen. Out of CLMV, only Vietnam is currently 
negotiating BTAs. Possible trade diversion effects of the FTAs might further deepen the gap 
if trade is diverted away from these less developed countries. Ultimately, this could heighten 
tensions that would weaken the fabric of the ASEAN community and widen development gap 
in the region. 
 
Lastly, overlapping FTAs might create a spaghetti-bowl problem, as warned by 
Baldwin (2006). The wide variety of phase-out tariff-schedules, exclusion lists, ROOs and 
their application forms could cause exporters to face different tariffs and rules for different 
products and destinations. 
III. Investment  Cooperation 
3.1.  ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) 
 
The Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA)
26 was signed in 
1998 with the aim of providing an environment conducive for free flow of direct investment, 
technology and skilled professionals. This entails developing and promoting the region as a 
single investment area. The agreement binds members to eliminate investment barriers, 
liberalise investment rules and policies, grant national treatment and open up industries 
(ASEAN, 1998). The AIA has expanded beyond manufacturing to include agriculture, 
                                                            
26 The full text of the Framework Agreement on AIA can be obtained at the ASEAN Secretariat website at: 
http://www.aseansec.org/6462.htm. For a concise summary and deeper assessment of the AIA, see: Jarvis, D. S. 
L. (2008). Foreign direct investment and investment liberalization in Asia: Assessing ASEAN’s initiatives. 
Working Paper.   11
mining, forestry and fishery sectors, and services incidental to these areas. To oversee 
implementation, a ministerial body, the AIA Council, and a Coordinating Committee on 
Investment was established. 
 
The AIA is radical in that it has greatly lifted long-established constrains on foreign 
investors in the following: restricted investment areas, restricted entry and establishment, 
restricted foreign shareholding, screening procedures and operational controls. This has 
produced impressive results. ASEAN foreign direct investment (FDI) flows for 2007 was 
US$ 61.5 billion, the highest to date since 1998, and representing a year-on-year growth of 
20.7 percent. Intra-ASEAN investment also grew, albeit more modestly, from US$ 6.1 billion 
in 2006 to US$ 8.2 billion in 2007
27.  
 
However, these statistics suggests some uncomfortable conclusions as well. Firstly, 
they show that like on the trade front, extra-ASEAN investment ties are much more robust 
than intra-ASEAN ties. As seen in Table 2, in 2006, intra-ASEAN investment, at US$ 385.5 
million, was overshadowed by extra-ASEAN investment, which stood at US$ 3,221.6 
million. This means members are competing more than cooperating to attract investment.  
Second, closer examination will reveal that FDI flows into the region are highly concentrated, 
with Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand accounting for 80 percent of total inflows between 
1995 and 2005
28. Also, FDI growth rates are uneven, generally to the advantage of the more 
developed nations. For instance, in the period 2004 to 2005, extra-ASEAN FDI inflow in 
Indonesia more than tripled to US$ 7.4 billion, while Vietnam’s inflow only rose 35 percent 
to US$ 1.8 billion. Thus, it can be tentatively concluded that the more developed members 
are benefiting more from AIA than the less developed.  
 
One possible reason for AIA’s failure in this respect is that other aspects of raising 
competitiveness have not been addressed well enough for the benefits of reduced foreign 
investment barriers to be reaped substantially. The breaking down of barriers removes 
deterrents but does not raise attractiveness. What will draw investors are improvements in 
infrastructure, labour and other pull-factors that would create a conducive environment for 
doing business. The ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO), though set up to 
address this, has not enjoyed as much success as AIA.  
 
3.2.  ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO) 
 
In tandem with AIA, the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO) was 
launched in 1996 to enhance industrial competitiveness through establishing a single 
production base in the region. An arrangement under the scheme consists of at least two 
ASEAN-based companies in the manufacturing sectors that have agreed to vertically 
integrate their operations. An “approved AICO product” enjoys preferential tariff rates of 0-5 
percent and unlimited access into markets of participating countries. So far, most projects 
                                                            
27 Statistics from: Vietnam News Agency. (2007, August 23). ASEAN looks for foreign investment. Retrieved 
from the Vietnam News Agency website: 
http://www.vnagency.com.vn/Home/EN/tabid/119/itemid/210324/Default.aspx 
28 Statistics from: ASEAN. (2008). Joint media statement of the fortieth ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) 
Meeting. Retrieved from the ASEAN Secretariat website: http://www.aseansec.org/21883.htm   12
come from the automotive sector; a handful are from the electrical and electronic and food 
processing sectors. 
 
Two factors restrict the scheme’s effectiveness. First, tariff reductions for “approved 
AICO products” are only in participating countries and not all ASEAN countries. Second, 
intermediate or raw materials only qualify for benefits if they are imported and used as inputs 
in the manufacture of the approved final product. 
 
IV.  ASEAN Framework Agreement for Services (AFAS) 
Following the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
29, the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement for Services (AFAS) aims to create a free trade area in services in the 
sectors of air transport services, maritime transport services, business and professional 
services such as accounting, engineering, telecommunication and financial services. Signed 
in 1995, AFAS entails cooperation in improving efficiency and competitiveness of service 
providers, reducing restrictions to trade in services among members, and liberalising trade in 
services beyond the scope in GATS. 
 
This vision of a free trade area in services, however, seems far from reality. Although 
ASEAN countries vary in openness, they generally have substantial restrictions placed on 
various service sectors. The AFAS hence seems to be ineffective. Currently, the rules that 
apply to the establishment of a commercial presence are similar to those stated in the national 
foreign investment laws, which apply to all foreign services suppliers, not just from ASEAN. 
Thus, ASEAN services suppliers receive no preferential treatment. Further, there is no 
freedom of movement of natural persons within the region to supply a service except for 
intra-corporate transferees, and AFAS does not aim to create a common market for trade in 
services. As such, the benefits to be derived from it are limited (Tan & Samtani, 2002). 
 
In seeking to eliminate substantially restrictions to trade in services among member 
countries, besides principles embedded in the agreement, there are AFAS initiatives that lead 
to tangible and visible results. Such initiatives centres around establishing or improving 
infrastructure facilities to actualise the principles laid out in AFAS. There are also 
suggestions for improvements in exchange of information so that data can travel faster 
between manufacturers, producers and sub-contractors to speed up the process of production. 
However, thus far, other than publicly available general target goals and schedules available 
on the website, scarce data has been provided on the effectiveness of such initiatives and the 
progress of their implementation. 
 
There is no feedback or evaluation mechanism. The lack of feedback mechanism also 
applies to bench marking. Perhaps, most importantly, there are no domestic state-based 
mechanisms for disciplining practices on regulation compliance among ASEAN member 
states. Without such mechanisms, the report of Regional Economic Policy Support Facility 
(REPSF Project No. 05/004) in 2006 cites shifting baselines and fluctuations in 
                                                            
29 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), of which all WTO members are participants, entered 
into force in 1995. It aims to provide for global exchanges in services a credible and reliable system of 
international trade rules, fair and equitable treatment of all participants, guaranteed policy bindings and 
promotion of liberalization.   13
implementation and practice as a frequent issue in AFAS predictability. The absence of 
disciplining mechanism also prevents best practices from being actualised and guided 
through regulatory measures. 
V.  Other Areas of Cooperation 
5.1.  Financial Integration 
 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis awakened the region to its unpreparedness at 
managing globalised capital flows. Thus, ASEAN+3 leaders agreed to promote regional 
financing agreement, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), in 2000. The scheme consists of an 
expanded ASEAN Swap Agreement (ASA) and a network of bilateral swap arrangements 
among members. Although its initiation is a commendable step, the total size of liquidity 
support to be available during crises is still relatively small. Hence, there is an imperative for 
further expansion.  
 
The current global financial turmoil is a window of opportunity for ASEAN to 
strengthen and make full use of its framework and mechanism to initiate collective response 
to stabilise financial instability and macroeconomic cooperation. So far, the response has 
been slow and ineffective. 
 
Another financial arrangement that ASEAN+3 has established is the Asian Bond 
Markets Initiative (ABMI). The scheme, which finance ministers agreed to promote in 2003, 
aims to develop efficient and liquid bond markets in Asia, so that Asian savings can be better 
utilised for Asian investments. Projects under the ABMI generally fall into two areas: 1) 
facilitating market access through increasing the range of issuers and types of bonds, and 2) 
improving market infrastructure to strengthen bond markets.    
 
5.2.  Market Integration 
 
Economic integration using a market approach entails reducing transaction costs 
arising from cross-border flows by developing nonofficial institutions that offer public and 
quasi-public good. This commonly achieved through building infrastructure linkages like 
roads and telecommunication lines, which would facilitate cross-border trade and investment 
flows. This approach can be contrasted with institutional integration, where institutional 
structures enforce preferential trade among agreeing partners. 
 
ASEAN economic integration, which is primarily driven by AFTA, AIA and AFAS, 
focuses more on the latter, although there are some market integration projects that the group 
is cooperating on, including the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL), ASEAN highway 
network, ASEAN Power Grid and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Network.  
 
More active in this aspect are the sub-regional arrangements in ASEAN. The Greater 
Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Economic Cooperation, which was established in 1992 with the 
help of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), has seen US$ 10 billion put into 180 
infrastructures and investment projects. 
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Growth triangles (GT), being in principle market-driven, have also been vehicles for 
market integration in the region. They are typically formed between three or more countries 
to exploit complementarities in their factor endowments. They provide an alternative to 
formal integration efforts as they are usually peripheral-oriented and private sector led. A 
number of them have emerged in ASEAN. The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand GT (IMT-GT), 
for example, was formed partly to reduce distribution costs through improvement of 
infrastructure linkages.  
 
Besides GTs’ capacity to develop cross-border infrastructure linkages, there are other 
reasons why they can complement AFTA. Indeed, ASEAN supports the implementation and 
development of GTs
30. Firstly, GTs can be seen as mechanisms working on a lower level to 
push smaller regions towards AFTA’s liberalisation goals. Secondly, they can help reduce 
non-tariff barriers because they involve economic as well as non-economic elements. Thirdly, 
they can cushion the politico-economic risks of regional liberalisation as they are flexible 
enough to accommodate parties’ unique interests. 
VI. Dispute  Settlement 
The 1996/2004 ASEAN Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM)
31, which 
covers disputes between members concerning AEC arrangements, was a step forward in 
dealing with ASEAN’s lack of a supranational decision-making or law-making body to not 
only arbitrate negotiations, but legitimise legal structures built to facilitate implementation of 
agreements. The DSM Protocol states that a dispute is referred to the Senior Economic 
Officials Meeting (SEOM) after bilateral negotiations fail to produce a resolution. However, 
the intergovernmental body has no institutional power to ensure its rulings are abided by 
(Hund, 2002).  
 
Under the Protocol, the role of the ASEAN Secretariat is to assist the panels and the 
Appellate Body, especially on legal, historical and procedural areas, providing secretarial and 
technical support, and assisting the SEOM in monitoring implementation of the findings and 
recommendations of the panel
32. However, it too had no legal power. The newly adopted 
ASEAN Charter
33 has been hailed for its provision of a legal impetus for the group
34. 
                                                            
30 Details of ASEAN’s role in the development of growth areas in the region can be found here: 
http://www.aseansec.org/4928.htm 
31 ASEAN member states adopted the Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 1996 – four years after the 
adoption of the AFTA Framework Agreement – and the Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Mechanism in 2004. The 
full text of the 1996 and 2004 Protocol on Dispute Mechanism can be found at the ASEAN Secretariat website: 
http://www.aseansec.org/4924.htm 
32 Art. 19 of the 2004 Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism: 
http://www.aseansec.org/16754.htm 
33 The ASEAN Charter, which consists of a set of laws committing members to democracy and economic 
integration, entered into force on 15 December 2008. More information about the Charter can be found on the 
ASEAN Secretariat website:  http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf 
34 See: Soeriaatmadja, W. (2008, December 16). Cheer over Asean charter. The Straits Times. Retrieved 
December 21, 2008, from 
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/SE%2BAsia/Story/STIStory_314949.html   15
Although it is still too early to determine whether this provision would improve the DSM, 
criticisms of ineffectiveness and lack of forwardness have already emerged. 
 
Limitations in this area are understandable as tensions between members are not just 
economic but political as well. Besides the competition in trade and investment, bilateral 
relations between ASEAN countries are also complicated by histories of envy and 
antagonism. Any viable institutional arrangement, hence, has to be sensitive to this. 
 
Another shortfall of the ASEAN DSM is that it covers only state-to-state disputes. The 
newly signed ACIA does include Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions, 
which were improved from those under the ASEAN IGA. However, such state-to-private 
sector dispute mechanisms are not addressed in AFTA and AFAS. There is also currently no 
DSM for disputes between private sectors for arrangements under the AEC, leaving it open 
without identifying any solution either based on domestic legal systems or arbitration or other 
procedures. This could be problematic as disputes are common and unavoidable in business 
exchanges, and the private sector’s participation is crucial for the success of AEC. This is 
especially so for AFAS, the implementation of which is predominantly driven by businesses 
that have taken the initiative to advance the slow-moving trade in services liberalisation 
process. 
VII. Challenges and Recommendations for ASEAN 
ASEAN has come a long way since it embarked on regional cooperation on trade and 
investment. The fundamental impeding issues in the region, though, have remained the same: 
testy political relations steeped in history, concerns of self-reliance, differing economic and 
political circumstances, and competitive rather than complementary economies. Thus, at the 
risk of oversimplifying, it can be inferred that every initiation of economic cooperation 
entails to a varying extent intricately balancing between appreciating these issues and making 
ambitious, effective agreements. Success cases generally represent innovative designs that 
overcome or sidestep these obstacles, and/or the presence of shared, imperative goals that 
unite members and transcend their conflicting interests. 
 
Given that the politico-economical obstacles are enduring, the ASEAN-style of 
decision-making that relies on consensus will not easily give way to a legal and more 
institutionalised mechanism, such as that adopted by EU and NAFTA. Hence, perhaps the 
speedier way to integration lies in innovation in designing agreements. The multilayered 
approach of the AFTA, for example, can be expanded beyond staggered liberalisation 
deadlines. Deeper integration may be easier within sub-sections of the region that have more 
similar characteristics such as the ASEAN-4, which consists of Malaysia, Thailand, 
Philippines and Indonesia. Hence, regional integration can be achieved gradually by creating 
sub-trading units within the region and then promoting linkages between them. This approach 
would cater to different levels of development, limit domination by more developed 
members, and curb exploitation by outsiders through members with more open economies. 
The latter can occur when manufacturers from non-ASEAN countries carry out a certain 
portion of their production in easily-accessible, open ASEAN economies such as Singapore, 
so as to satisfy AFTA’s relatively liberal Rules of Origin (ROO) and enjoy benefits such as 
lower tariffs. 
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The design of the current DSM can also be improved to better balance between 
diplomacy and institutionalisation. An autonomous body of representatives from member 
states can be established to arbitrate and resolve disputes by making legally binding 
decisions. This arrangement could be assimilated into the current bodies overseeing the 
implementation of agreements such as the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) for 
AFAS and the AIA Council for AIA.  
 
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s existing style of negotiating can be strengthened. Firstly, 
greater urgency can be emphasised as the region faces economic threats from rapidly 
developing neighbours such as China and India. As the 1997 Asian economic crisis showed, a 
collective will to tackle shared concerns can speed up the integration process. Secondly, the 
norm of agreeing to initiatives first then discussing details later should be phased out. Such a 
negotiating style has led to agreements that are vague and haphazard in implementation. 
ASEAN decision-makers must work towards concretely laying out the necessary details to 
aid coherent and effective execution. 
 
Perhaps because of its negotiating style, ASEAN currently faces the problem of a 
confusing array of arrangements that have been slow or stagnant in implementation.  To 
move from this point would require greater concentration on management of existing 
agreements, initiatives and commitments. The practice of setting up of sub-committees and 
working groups to oversee execution seems to serve this function well. The AIA, for 
instance, involves a ministerial-level Investment Area Council and an assisting Coordinating 
Committee on Investment, which oversee, coordinate and implement the AIA among member 
states, performing roles such as reviewing parties’ Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) and 
Sensitive List (SL). Existing arrangements, hence, can be followed through more effectively 
if such bodies are established to steer operations, manage resources and review progress. For 
example, the adoption of ASEAN Economic Blueprint should be followed with the 
empowerment of the ASEAN Secretariat to monitor the implementation of AEC Blueprint 
through the publication of performance scorecards. 
 
New challenges have also emerged due to contextual changes. Firstly, as ASEAN 
countries continue to pursue FTAs and other economic cooperation agreements with non-
ASEAN partners, the network of extra-regional arrangements will grow and become more 
complex. The challenge would be to harmonise these arrangements so that they are consistent 
with efforts to realise the AEC. ASEAN’s recognition for the need to integrate arrangements, 
as reflected in the goals of newly signed agreements ATIGA and ACIA
35, is commendable. 
This same approach should be applied to raise the complementariness between other ASEAN 
arrangements, and between ASEAN and non-ASEAN arrangements. 
 
Secondly, ASEAN would have to contend with an increasingly globalised world 
where international investors look for not just large markets but immobile assets such as 
robust infrastructure, skilled labour, and supporting policies and institutions (UNCTAD, 
1999). As AFTA and AIA focus on developing institutional support such as in liberalisation 
policies, capacity building in tangible areas such as human resource and infrastructure is less 
                                                            
35 One of the key elements of the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) is to consolidate all goods-
related intra-ASEAN obligations, commitments and initiatives to create a more user-friendly agreement. The 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) integrates the two existing agreements related to 
investment promotion and protection – the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and ASEAN Investment Guarantee 
Agreement (IGA).   17
emphasised. Hence, greater cooperation is needed in developing members’ capabilities, 
which would boost both individual members’ and the region’s attractiveness as investment 
destinations and trade partners. 
 
The Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) is commendable for addressing this issue. 
Besides accelerating the scheme, ASEAN should also work more closely with sub-regional 
arrangements such as the GMS program and GTs (see Box 1). These lower level 
arrangements have potential to boost regional cooperation on building capacities and 
infrastructure as they are in a more advantageous position to mobilise the peripheral areas and 
private sector. ASEAN’s current support for these arrangements could be expanded to 
include assistance in mobilising resources and providing expertise, and integration with wider 
economic cooperation initiatives. The benefits are two-fold. First, the performance of these 
sub-regional initiatives would be improved. Second, ASEAN would be able to better align its 
goals with these arrangements, creating a more consistent and effective network of trade and 
investment related cooperation arrangements in the region. 
 
Box 1: Harmonising ASEAN and non-ASEAN arrangements: Case study of the Initiative for 
ASEAN Integration (IAI) program and the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Economic 
Cooperation 
Having similar goals and target areas for development, IAI and GMS run the risk of overlap 
and contradiction. However, given their differing approaches, and strengths and shortfalls, there is 
also potential for integration and greater synergy. The IAI was conceived during the Fourth ASEAN 
Informal Summit in Singapore in 2000 with the aim of closing the development gap in ASEAN 
through creating opportunities for the more developed ASEAN countries, namely Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, to assist the less developed members, namely 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, also known as the CLMV countries. The GMS was formed 
between the CLMV countries, Thailand and China in 1992 with the help of ADB. The initiative aims 
to raise the level of development of its members through intensifying connectivity and cooperation.  
The scopes of the two arrangements overlap considerably. They both target the following 
areas: human resource development, trade facilitation, infrastructure, tourism, information 
communication technology and environment. However, so far, they have focused on different areas. 
The GMS’s main thrust has been the building and upgrading of physical infrastructure such as road 
networks, power transmission linkages and telecommunications interconnectivity. The IAI, on the 
other hand, places human resource development as its priority, leading to a focus on education, 
skills development and worker training.  
Integration of the two programs has several advantages. First, their differing areas of focus 
and neglect can be made complementary. For example, IAI can provide the training and expertise for 
the Mekong countries to run and optimise the use of infrastructures built by GMS. Second, integration 
would entail a larger pool of shared resources such as finances, information, and management 
personnel. Thirdly, resource mobilisation might be enhanced, if the donor coordination mechanisms 
of the two schemes are integrated.  
Opening up a channel for dialogue and mutual information exchange is a crucial first step 
towards the integration of IAI and GMS. This can be achieved through institutionalising high‐level 
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Table 1: PTAs involving ASEAN countries (as of December 2008) 
RTAs BTAs 
Established (year signed, 
year in force) 
Under negotiation  Established  (year 
signed, year in force) 
Under negotiation 
AFTA: ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (1992, 1993) 
ACFTA: ASEAN-China 
Free Trade Area (2002, 
2003) 
AKFTA: ASEAN-Korea 
Free Trade Area (2004, 
2006) 
APTA: Asia-Pacific Trade 
Agreement (2005, 2006) 
ESFTA: EFTA-Singapore 







ASEAN+3: East Asia Free 
Trade Area 
ASEAN+6: East Asia 
Summit Free Trade Area 
AANZFTA: ASEAN-







BIMSTEC: Bay of Bengal 
Initiative for Multisectoral, 
Technical and Economic 
Cooperation* 
PTA-D-8: Preferential Tariff 
Arrangement-Group of Eight 
Developing Countries 

















(2008, - ) 
Singapore-Gulf 
Cooperation Council 
(2008, - ) 
Singapore-Hashemite 





































































Table 2: Foreign direct investments net inflow, intra- and extra-ASEAN, 2004-2006 (value in US$ million; change in percent) 
2004 2005 2006 Year-on-year  change   
(2004-2005) 







































Darussalam  19.7 192.4 212.0 19.4 269.1 288.5  9.7  423.8 433.5 (1.2)  39.9 36.1  (50.0) 57.5 50.2 
Cambodia  31.9  99.5  131.4 129.2 252.0 381.2 155.5 327.7 483.2 304.8 153.4  190.2  20.4  30.0 26.8 
Indonesia  204.2  1,690.3 1,894.5  883.3  7,452.7 8,336.0 1,524.5 4,031.7 5,556.2  332.5  340.9  340.0  72.6  (45.9) (33.3) 
Lao, PDR  7.8  9.2  16.9  6.7  21.0  27.7  10.6  176.8  187.4  (13.8)  129.4  63.8  58.0  740.2  575.8 
Malaysia  980.2 3,643.7  4,623.9 572.9 3,391.9  3,964.8 467.8 5,591.9  6,059.7 (41.6)  (6.9) (14.3)  (18.3)  64.9  52.8 
Myanmar  9.3  241.8 251.1 38.4 197.5 235.9 27.8 115.2 143.0  311.9  (18.3)  (6.1)  (27.5)  (41.7)  (39.4) 
Philippines  71.1  616.7  687.8  12.7  1,841.3  1,854.0 (95.6) 2,440.6  2,345.0 (82.1)  198.6 169.6  (852.7)  32.5  26.5 
Singapore  548.0  19,279.5 19,827.5 1,175.6 13,826.3 15,001.9 1,137.7 22,917.7 24,055.4  114.5  (28.3)  (24.3)  (3.2)  65.8  60.3 
Thailand  688.7 5,173.3  5,862.0 762.2 8,194.8  8,957.0  2,822.1  7,933.9  10,756.1 10.7  58.4  52.8 270.2  (3.2)  20.1 
Vietnam  242.9 1,367.2  1,610.1 164.7 1,856.1  2,020.8 181.9 2,178.1  2,360.0 (32.2)  35.8  25.5  10.4  17.3  16.8 
ASEAN  2,803.7 32,313.5 35,117.2 3,765.1 37,302.7 41,067.8 6,242.1 46,137.4 52,379.5  34.3  15.4  16.9  65.8  23.7  27.5 
ASEAN-5  2492.2  30,403.4  32,895.7  3,406.8  34,706.9  38,113.7  5,856.6  42,915.8  48,772.4  36.7  14.2 15.9 71.9  23.7 28.0 
BLCMV  311.5 1,910.0  2,221.5 358.4 2,595.8  2,954.2 385.5 3,221.6  3,607.1  15.0  35.9  33.0  7.6  24.1  22.1 
Source: ASEAN Foreign Direct Investments Database (compiled from data submission of central banks, national statistical offices and other relevant government agencies) 
 





Table 3: Total ASEAN Trade, 2005-2006 (value in US$ million; change in percent) 
Exports Imports  Total  trade 

































Darussalam  1,887.3  24.8  5,732.0  75.2 745.8 50.1 743.1 49.9  2,633.2  28.9 6,475.1 71.1 
Cambodia  235.4  6.7 3,279.1  93.3 991.2 33.9  1,931.8  66.1  1,226.5  19.1 5,210.9 80.9 
Indonesia  18,483.1 18.3 82,315.5 81.7 19,379.2 31.7 41,686.3 68.3  37,862.3 23.4 124,001.8 76.6 
Lao,  PDR  289.8 72.0 112.8 28.0 500.7 85.2  86.8 14.8  790.5 79.8  199.7  20.2 
Malaysia  40,979.6 26.1  116,247.3  73.9 32,290.7 25.2 96,025.5 74.8  73,270.2 25.7 212,272.7 74.3 
Myanmar  2,149.7 61.2 1,365.0 38.8 1,174.7 55.5  940.8  44.5 3,324.4 59.0  2,305.9  41.0 
The  Philippines  8,192.2  17.3 39,217.9 82.7 10,218.3 19.7 41,555.3 80.3  18,410.5 18.6  80,773.3  81.4 
Singapore  83,801.6 30.9  187,806.3  69.1 62,300.4 26.1  176,181.6  73.9  146,102.0  28.6 363,987.9 71.4 
Thailand  26,944.2 22.2 94,635.3 77.8 23,539.8 18.5  103,569.0  81.5 50,484.0 20.3 198,204.3 79.7 
Vietnam  6,214.0  16.8 30,819.7 83.2 12,453.7 31.0 27,783.1 69.0  18,667.7 24.2  58,602.8  75.8 
ASEAN  189,176.8 25.2 561,531.0 74.8 163,594.5 25.0 490,503.3 75.0 352,771.4  25.1  1,052,034.3  74.9 






Table 4: An foreign direct investments net inflow from selected partner 
countries/regions (value in US$ million; change in percent) 
Value  Share to total net inflow 
Country 
2004 2005 2006  2002-2006  2004  2005  2006  2002-
2006 
ASEAN  2,803.7 3,765.1 6,242.1 19,377.7  8.0  9.2  11.9 11.3 
USA  5,232.4 3,010.6 3,864.9 13,736.1 14.9  7.3  7.4  8.0 
Japan  5,732.1 7,234.8  10,803.3  30,813.7 16.3 17.6 20.6 18.0 
European 
Union (EU)-25  10,046.1 11,139.6 13,361.9  44,955.6  28.6  27.1  25.5  26.3 
China  731.5 502.1 936.9 2,302.9  2.1  1.2  1.8  1.3 
Republic of 
Korea  806.4 577.7  1,099.1 3,347.3  2.3  1.4  2.1  2.0 
Australia  566.7 195.9 399.2 1,444.3  1.6  0.5  0.8  0.8 
India 118.7  351.7  (380.4)  295.1  0.3  0.9  (0.7)  0.2 
Canada  301.2 161.3 274.0  1,184.9  0.9  0.4  0.5  0.7 
New Zealand  3.5  480.7  (282.8)  392.1  0.0 1.2  (0.5)  0.2 




26,347.1 27,422.9 36,331.7 117,866.4  75.0  66.8  69.4  69.0 
Others  8,770.1  13,644.9  16,047.9  52,955.4 25.0 33.2 30.6 31.0 
Total  35,117.2 41,067.8 52,379.5 170,821.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ASEAN Foreign Direct Investments Database (compiled from data submission of central banks, 
national statistical offices and other relevant government agencies) 
Notes: 
(-) not available as of publication time 
 (n.a.) not applicable 
(_) less than 0.1% 
European Union (EU)-25 includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
Others include inflow from all other countries, including Russia, as well as total reinvested earnings in the 





Table 5: ASEAN trade by selected partner country/region, 2006 (value in US$ million; 
share in percent) 
Value  Share to total ASEAN trade 
Country 
Exports Imports  Total  trade  Exports  Imports  Total 
trade 
ASEAN  189,176.8  163,594.5 352,771.4 25.2 25.0 25.1 
Japan  81,284.9 80,495.6 161,780.5 10.8 12.3 11.5 




94,471.8 66,118.1 160,589.9 12.6 10.1 11.4 
China 65,010.3  74,950.9  139,961.2  8.7  11.5  10.0 
Republic  of  Korea 25,670.0  26,849.7 52,519.6 3.4 4.1 3.7 
Australia  23,148.5  13,262.8  36,411.4  3.1 2.0 2.6 
India  18,928.1  9,774.6 28,702.7 2.5 1.5 2.0 
Canada  3,916.4 2,970.3  6,886.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Russia  1,583.0 2,841.1  4,424.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 
New  Zealand  3,018.6 1,531.2  4,549.8  0.4 0.2 0.3 
Pakistan 2,986.2  296.1  3,282.4  0.4  -  0.2 
Total selected partner 
countries/regions  606,138.2  506,937.5  1,113,075.7  80.7 77.5 79.2 
Others  144,569.6  147,160.4 291,730.0 19.3 22.5 20.8 
Total  750,707.8 654,097.8 1,404,805.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ASEAN Trade Database (compiled from data submission and/or websites of ASEAN Member 
Countries’ national statistical offices and other relevant government agencies) 
Notes: 
(-) not available as of publication time 
European Union (EU)-25 includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
Others include trade of all other countries and those that could not be attributed to specific countries. 
 
 
 
  